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Abstract? Neuropsychological results are increasingly cited in cognitive theories although their methodology has been severely
criticised. The book argues for an eclectic approach but particularly stresses the use of single-case studies. A range of potential
artifacts exists when inferences are made from such studies to the organisation of normal function - for example, resource differences
among tasks, premorbid individual differences, and reorganisation of function. The use of "strong" and "classical" dissociations
minimises potential artifacts. The theoretical convergence between findings from fields where cognitive neuropsychology is well
developed and those from the normal literature strongly suggests that the potential artifacts are not critical. The fields examined in
detail in this respect are short-term memory, reading, writing, the organisation of input and output speech systems, and visual
perception. Functional dissociation data suggest that not only are input systems organised modularly, but so are central systems. This
conclusion is supported by findings on impairment of knowledge, visual attention, supervisory functions, memory, and
consciousness.
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From neuropsychology to mental structure (hereafter
Neuropsychology) is concerned with what we can learn
from investigations of the behavior of brain damaged
patients about the organisation of the normal cognitive
system. The status of such neuropsychological evidence
has changed dramatically over the last 20 years. The
hallmark of classical neurology was the description of a
great variety of highly specific and surprising impair-
ments resulting from brain damage. In the 1970s, such
observations were considered fascinating in their own
right as well as clinically important but they were not
often taken to be particularly relevant to an understand-
ing of normal functions. So Fodor et al. (1974) could write
"remarkably little has been learned about the psychology
of language processes in normals from over a hundred
years of aphasia study" (p. xiv), and Postman (1975) could
write regarding memory that "The existing data do not
Impress us as unequivocal; more important extrapolations
from pathological data to the study of normal function are
of uncertain validity" (p. 308). By the 1980s these views
seemed strange. Thus, neuropsychological dissociations
became central pillars for Fodor's (1983) own modular
model of mind and In normal memory research on the
explicit/implicit contrast, which stemmed directly from
discoveries on amnesic patients (see Roediger, 1990, for
review) became very fashionable.
1. Neuropsychological findings: Their attraction
and their problems
There are at least three reasons why interest in neuropsy-
chological findings should have increased. Empirical
phenomena in the corresponding study of normal pro-
cesses - human experimental psychology - are very
slippery things. Many factors affect any experimental
procedure. Make a slight change in one aspect - rate of
presentation, stimulus material, recall delay, amount of
practice, and so on - and the effect disappears or reap-
pears, although according to theory, it should not. There-
fore, even if a phenomenon is narrowly -robust, the
experimental result provides only a most insecure plat-
form for theoretical inferences. The first attraction of
neuropsychological evidence Is that all these factors
shrink in significance by comparison with the size and
specificity of observed deficits.
The weakness of the empirical methods available in
"normal" human experimental psychology has a second
consequence; we have little idea of the vastness of the
problems that need to be tackled. A pessimist can view
them as producing islands of detailed empirical knowl-
edge surrounded by a sea of ignorance, whose size we
conceal from ourselves by vague theorising (see Newell
1973). Neuropsychology can help in this second respect,
too. Advanced clinical practice contains the distilled
"craft" knowledge of more than 100 years of observation
of patients by neurologists and neuropsychologists. As
neurological disease can affect just about every part of the
brain the disorders that have been described will proba-
bly encompass damage to nearly all the cognitive mecha-
nisms. "Inverting" the set of disorders that exist might
enable us to map the subcomponents of mind.
The third reason for the increase in interest in neuro-
psychological findings is that the information processing
approach to modelling cognitive processes that was de-
veloping in the 1960s and 1970s provided a conceptual
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system which lent itself to the evaluation of neuropsy-
chological observations. Observed syndromes appeared
to fit with how a system with damaged subsystems would
operate.
The increasing respectability of neuropsychological ev-
idence in discussions of normal function, however, hid a
growing rift among those working within neuropsychol-
ogy. Very different methods continue to be used. In
particular, those with a neuroscience or a clinical back-
ground tend to favour standard group study procedures,
but a growing minority of neuropsychologists with a
cognitive science background strongly favour single-case
studies. Nor is this just a matter of a preference between
two accepted approaches having different types of payoff.
Many practitioners have been dubious about the scien-
tific value of approaches different from their own, and
their doubts have recently become public. Thus Ba-
decker and Caramazza (1985) argued that the approach in
which the performance of groups of Broca's and Wer-
nicke's aphasics are contrasted is inherently flawed. Car-
amazza (1986) went on to reject group studies as inap-
propriate in principle for making extrapolations to normal
function because the performance pattern of individuals
in a group may differ qualitatively from the mean. The
complementary criticism, that single-case studies are
unscientific, has been voiced less frequently. Even rela-
tively favourable critics like Zurif et al. (1989) point out,
however, that single-case studies seem especially prone
to problems from the selection of premorbidly atypical
subjects and from the adoption of idiosyncratic strategies
by individual patients. In addition, to extrapolate from
either group or single-case studies one must assume in
practice that no critical reorganisation of function takes
place after the lesion; there is little or no evidence for this.
Moreover, as novel tasks are often used, neuropsycholo-
gical studies are prone to standard problems of experi-
mental psychology methodology such as differences in
task difficulty and variations by subject strategy.
There are even major differences between the methods
used by different practitioners within both the group and
the single-case approaches. In about 1980, researchers
using the single-case approach tended to study individual
patients as exemplars of particular syndromes, sets of
symptoms found to co-occur frequently (e.g., deep dys-
lexia, Coltheart 1980a). Some argued that the most appro-
priate syndromes to study were those arising from "frac-
tionation," namely, the analysis of increasingly selective
Impairments on the grounds that they would be in-
creasingly likely to result from damage to individual
subsystems (Beauvois & Derouesne 1979; Shallice 1979).
By the mid-1980s, however, the most common belief
among those who advocated the single-case approach was
that "a syndrome thought at time t to be due to damage to
a single unitary module is bound to have fractionated by
time t + 2 years into a host of awkward subtypes" (Ellis
1987). This would favor studying unique cases: Generalis-
ing across patients pretheoretically is likely to be func-
tionally misleading; only the performance of individual
patients should be related to theory (Caramazza 1986;
Coltheart 1985; Morton & Patterson 1980). The classifica-
tion of patients as exemplars of particular syndromes is
also rejected (e.g., Caramazza & Badecker 1989; Ellis
1987). Although this approach may be seem logically
satisfactory, it is difficult to see how a science could
operate effectively as a social system if cross-patient
replication and classification are abandoned. The data-
base would become extremely cumbersome.
Such basic disagreements about method in neuropsy-
chology make it important to examine empirical and
inferential methodology, especially as the negative as-
pects of both positions could be correct, in which case the
dismissive views of the 1970s about neuropsychology
such as those of Fodor et al. (1974) and Postman (1975)
referred to earlier may have been valid. In general, for a
particular set of observations on the performance of a
patient, even if there existed a complete theory of how
the relevant tasks were performed there would be no
direct way to know which putative component(s) were
damaged. Moreover, if one took each subcomponent in
turn, to know what behavior the damaged system could
produce would require a complete specification of how
damage might affect the operation of each subcompo-
nent. Inferring the underlying undamaged system from
an observed impairment requires rather strong assump-
tions about how the normal cognitive system might oper-
ate and what the consequences of damage might be.
The large number of highly specific, qualitatively di-
verse disorders In clinical neuropsychology suggests
some form of modularity. There are also many other
arguments in favour of modularity - from linguistics (e.g.,
Chomsky 1980), neurophysiology (e.g., Cowey 1985),
system design (Marr 1982; Simon 1969) as well as from
information-processing psychology, especially mental
chronometry (e.g., Fodor 1983; McLeod et al. 1985;
Posner 1978; Sternberg 1969). Neuropsychology accord-
ingly examines the implications of modular assumptions
for neuropsychological research.
Modularity provides the central theoretical assump-
tion for much of the first half'of Neuropsychology (Chap-
ters 2-10), which asks what neuropsychological research
can reveal about a system organised in this way. Chapter
11 addresses the more abstract question of whether any
other forms of cognitive architecture — In particular
connectionist ones - are as compatible with the types of
selective impairments observed. Chapters 12 to 16 ask
what other types of systems are required to enable a set of
qualitatively distinct processing systems to function effec-
tively, and in particular, what information neuropsychol-
ogy can provide on this point.
inferences to the organisation of modular
The approach advocated in Neuropsychology for drawing
inferences from eeuropsychological findings about the
nature of modular systems is an old one. In 1885, Licht-
heim drew a distinction between a "pure case" in which
only a single subsystem Is impaired and a "mixed case" in
which more than one subsystem Is affected and favoured
the observation of pure cases. Pretheoretically, however,
one cannot know whether any observed disorder is pure
or mixed. It is argued that fractionation is generally an
appropriate procedure for obtaining "pure cases," and
that a strong emphasis should be given to dissociations as
those aspects of a mixed case will also be found in a pure
one. The approach advocated leads to a bias toward
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single-case studies but not to the exclusion of group
studies.
As the criticisms of both feuding camps indicate neuro-
psychological inferences are subject to a variety of poten-
tial artifacts. Any method for relating neuropsychological
findings to normal function therefore requires justifica-
tion. A procedure for obtaining data in science can be
validated either "internally," by showing how its assump-
tions are valid, or "externally," by demonstrating that on
known terrain its conclusions agree with those of more
established procedures. Neuropsychology adopts both
internal and external validation. In this Precis I concen-
trate on "internal" validation (Neuropsychology Chapters
2, 9, 10), because "external" validation - Section 2
(Chapters 3-8) - depends on a level of detail that cannot
be provided in such a synopsis.
What follows is a set of methodological assumptions for
inferring normal function from neuropsychological find-
ings. The aim is either to test existing theories or to
stimulate new theories by producing counterintuitive
findings. One can accomplish the latter, however, only if
the relation between damage to a subcomponent and
impaired task performance is fairly transparent; Gregory
(1961) has pointed out that this is often not the case in
machines.
The methodological assumptions fall into three groups:
The type of models to be considered.
1. The cognitive system being investigated contains a
large set of isolable processing subsystems (in the sense of
Posner 1978) or modules (in the sense of Marr 1982).
2. The modularity operates on a number of levels. As
far as neuropsychology is concerned, however, there is a
limit to the fineness of the grain of the modularity
3. Following Marr (1982), isolable processing sub-
systems may be viewed as having functions carried out by
algorithms implemented by particular mechanisms.
From the model to performance.
4. Cognitive systems are qualitatively similar across
individuals for tasks that are routinely performed in a
culture.
5. Task performance requires the use of a "procedure"
- a temporary activating or inhibiting of sets of intersub-
system transmission routes, which leaves a particular
route or set of "routes" through the network of sub-
systems active. The concept of a "procedure" is intended
to be a realisation of the idea of a "control process"
(Atkinson & Shiffrin 1968).
6. Tasks may at times be carried out by more than one
procedure — that is, more that one combination of sub-
systems. If the procedure for carrying out each task is
specified, however, the overall pattern of performance -
namely, the gross pattern of associations and dissociations
shown by the patient - depends on how much is needed
of the available resources in each subsystem; task perfor-
mance is monotonically related to that amount. (The
concept "resource" is used in the sense of Norman &
Bobrow 1975.)
The effect of lesions.
7. Lesions vary greatly in the subsystems they affect,
with respect both to their number and their identity; in
any particular case, the identity and the number of
impaired subsystems is not ascertainable independently
of the behavior of the patient.
8. The effect of a lesion on task performance is deter-
mined by (a) the pattern of quantitative loss of resources
across the normal set of subsystems, with (b) the pro-
cedure adopted by the subject. (Which procedure is
being used should be determined by empirical investiga-
tion. However, with no further information it is assumed
that the procedure adopted is the one that optimises
performance given the impairment by allowing the task to
be carried out using less damaged subsystems or it is the
one normal subjects typically use to carry out the task.)
9. Individual differences among normal subjects in the
extent of the resources available are small compared to
the destructive effects of neurological disease on
resources.
To make predictions in any particular case, one needs
additional assumptions about specific models. Most of the
assumptions are fairly standard, being similar to those
advocated by Caramazza (1986, although I draw different
conclusions from them). Two concepts require explana-
tion, however. "Resources" and "procedures" are intro-
duced because methodological problems arising from
differences in task difficulty and subjects' strategies are at
least as pervasive in neuropsychology as in standard
experimental psychology. If the foregoing assumptions
are accepted certain consequences follow:
1. The theoretical relevance of neuropsychological re-
search will depend on what can be learned about the
operation of a system from how it behaves when it is
damaged. Consider in particular, following assumption 3,
a system characterisable as a set of isolable subsystems,
each having a function for the system as a whole, and
realised by an algorithm implemented by a specific mech-
anism. In his discussion of levels of explanation, Marr
(1982) argues that to understand the normal functioning
of such a system, one must proceed from the highest level
down; he argues against attempting a mechanistic expla-
nation on the level of actual or hypothetical hardware in
the absence of functional or algorithmic specifications. In
particular cases, this may prove to be too sweeping a
position because the particular hardware available (e.g.,
slow parallel circuitry) may make some types of (mathe-
matical) functions much easier to compute than others.
Marr's argument may apply, however, to attempts to
infer how hypothetical subsystems might work from be-
havioural impairments following lesions. Trying to deter-
mine the particular mechanisms employed by the sub-
system from this type of evidence would be like trying to
deduce how computer hardware works by examining the
malfunctioning of a program caused by a machine fault
when one does not know the program's structure. This
would almost certainly be a hopeless task; inferences to
the algorithmic level would be almost as difficult.
If one tries instead to ascertain overall modular
organisation - i.e., what functionally isolable subsystems
exist and what each one does - the picture is more
promising. If a single subsystem were severely damaged,
the ability of the organism to perform a particular micro-
function would be grossly impaired. In many cases,
specific consequences would be expected. If in such cases
one looks at the whole range of tasks the organism can
perform, those on which performance is impaired are
likely to be relatively insensitive to the specific nature of
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the damage in a subsystem (or transmission route), pro-
vided that the impairment is severe. The set of tasks on
which impaired performance occurs will be relatively
unchanged when there is a change in the nature of the
damage within the subsystem. This is expressed by As-
sumptions 6 and 8.
The most promising level for interaction between neu-
ropsychology and the theory of normal processing is not
that of detailed computational models, but more global
functional architecture. This corresponds to information-
processing theory as represented by the work of Morton
(1970), Posner (1978), and Bruce and Young (1986).
Neuropsychological evidence may also be useful for test-
ing theories at the algorithmic or implementational lev-
els, but this is still an open question.
2. Nearly all theories of normal function that are de-
rived from neuropsychological findings have assumed
that the relevant patients exhibited a "pure syndrome,"
that only a single subsystem was damaged. Newcombe
and Marshall (1980), for example, in the context of a 2-
route model of reading, argued that reading using the so-
called "semantic route" alone is inherently unstable; they
assumed that the semantic errors in deep dyslexia arise
because the syndrome corresponds to normal reading
lacking only spelling-to-sound translation.
Patients who exhibit a set of dissociations - they per-
form normally on a group of tasks except for one where
they are severely impaired - provide the best oppor-
tunity for testing theories. The most selective dissocia-
tions also occur in pure cases, making them especially
important. Assumptions 1 and 7 suggest, however, that
for typical subsystems pure patients will be rare. Hence
there will usually not be data from a group large enough
for effective averaging. Thus as finer and finer aspects of
the cognitive architecture are investigated in attempts to
infer normal function, neuropsychology will be forced to
resort more and more to single-case studies. By Assump-
tions 4 and 9, however, valid inferences to normal func-
tion should be feasible from findings on single patients.
3. The problem exists for concentrating on patients
with pure syndromes, that there is no theory-indepen-
dent way to determine whether a set of symptoms exhib-
ited by one patient arises from a single-component or a
multiple-component disorder.
Ellis (1987) has made a further objection to focusing on
patients with pure syndromes: "The cognitive neuropsy-
chologist will pass over 999 patients to find the one
thousandth who comes close to being a pure case of 'word
meaning deafness' or whatever" (p. 402). There are two
answers to this kind of objection. First, the concept of a
pure case - like that of an "Ideal gas" In physics - may be
useful even if it is not realised in any real patient. Any
dissociation observed in a multicomponent syndrome
also occurs in a pure syndrome. Consider a prototypic
dissociation In which normal performance is obtained on
one task (I) and grossly impaired performance is obtained
on another task (II) of roughly comparable difficulty.
Assume that subsystems operate in an all-or-none fashion
- when damaged they will not support any procedure (see
Assumption 5) that requires them. Then the existence of
the dissociation implies that there are one or more sub-
systems Involved In the carrying out of task II but not of
task I. The same dissociation Is produced if just one of
these critical subsystems Is damaged (a pure case) as more
than one, together possibly with other subsystems unre-
lated to tasks I and II (a mixed case). Therefore, in a
dissociation, even when observed in a mixed syndrome,
both the intact and the Impaired performance will coexist
in at least one pure syndrome. An analogous argument
applies to the more Important case of a set of dissociations
or a group of tasks in which only one is impaired. (These
arguments apply properly only to so-called "pure tasks,"
see Neuropsychology, Chapter 10.)
The argument does not apply for an association in
which the performance on two tasks is impaired with no
Indication of qualitative or quantitative equivalence in
the way they are Impaired. If the impairment on Task I
arises from damage to subsystems that are not Involved in
Task II, and vice versa, the association of deficits in the
two may be observed only In the mixed syndrome; it may
not occur In any pure syndrome. Hence sets of dissocia-
tions are heuristically important. They are safer than
associated deficits in that they necessarily mimic what
happens in a pure syndrome. Moreover, they occur
reasonably frequently in neuropsychological practice. So
they make the pure-syndrome approach a viable one.
The second response to Ellis's (1987) criticisms relates
to his fear that "recognised syndromes will inevitably be
prone to multiply and change at an alarming rate" (p.
410). If we are to be alarmed at this prospect, the set of
syndromes that are multiplying and changing are pre-
sumably doing so in a chaotic fashion, so they do not
provide any solid clues about the organisation of the
underlying structure. A fractionation approach (selecting
more selective impairments for study) however, will lead
to purer and hence more informative syndromes. As a
heuristic procedure, though, it should not be rigidly
applied.
4. If Assumptions 6 and 9 are valid and the various
procedures drawing upon a subsystem rely on it equally,
the overall pattern of impairment from damage to a
particular subsystem in different patients will be
qualitatively similar and the same set of dissociations will
be found. This suggests a useful classification system in
which patients are categorised theoretically In terms of
the hypothetical subsystems Impaired. When the
organisation of subsystems remains theoretically unclear
the empirical "units" of the classification scheme corre-
spond to the most selective Impairments observed, al-
though from the logic of the fractionation procedure, such
an empirical classification scheme can only be pro-
visional.
This classification scheme provides: (i) a set of patients
with whom more details theory about the hypothesised
component can be tested. This also allows for replication
or failures thereof; (ii) the possibility of finding anatomical
correlates of the hypothesised subsystem; and (ili) a
principled basis for forming functionally derived groups if
enough patients are available. Group studies of amnesia
defined as a set of dissociations Including impaired perfor-
mance on (episodic) memory tasks (see Chapter 15) pro-
vide one example of this classification scheme.
5. Although it is the most Important neuropsycholo-
gical source of information about the functional architec-
ture investigating patients with orderly sets of dissocia-
tions Is not the only possibility. Another is the critical
variable method, where the performance of a certain type
of task is affected in one patient (A) by a change in variable
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X but not by a change in variable Y, and the complemen-
tary effect is observed in another patient (B). Patterson
(1981) used this approach to differentiate a number of
different forms of acquired dyslexia and interpreted them
as arising from damage to different components in a
three-route model of reading.
Error patterns can also be revealing. The semantic
errors that occur in deep dyslexia (Coltheart 1980a;
Marshall & Newcombe 1973) suggest that such patients
cannot use spelling-to-sound translation and so they must
be using a second (semantic) route to access semantics
without phonological mediation, one that normal subjects
presumably have available, too. In addition, because
different procedures can draw upon the same subsystem,
certain patterns of association between deficits can be
informative too, although general problems with making
inferences from associations make them appropriate only
if the impairments on the two tasks can be equated
quantitatively. For example, Caramazza et al. (1987)
described an agraphic patient who had equivalent error
rates across letter positions when writing both words and
nonwords. The patient had no difficulty in writing letters,
so the authors inferred that there must exist a stage prior
to motor output that is common to both writing words and
nonwords.
6. Group studies have recently been strongly crit-
icised because of potential averaging artifacts (e.g., Car-
amazza 1986; Caramazza & Badecker 1989). These au-
thors argued that only single-case studies are relevant for
inferring normal function. Dissociations and sets of
dissociations can be obtained from group studies, too,
however, with group assignment based on syndrome
classification, lesion location or disease process (e. g., Par-
kinsonian). Such findings can be used to infer normal
function because performance dissociations between two
groups will standardly also manifest themselves between
pairs of Individuals, one from each group. The mean
contrast is hence representative of the behavior of certain
individuals. Thus, one can normally make the same
Inferences from dissociations whether they are produced
by individuals or groups. Although group studies are in
many areas less informative than single-case studies, they
are just as legitimate. Moreover, they suffer less from
certain other potential artifacts.
It Is noteworthy that critics of group studies have
concentrated their attacks on the studies in which groups
are defined In terms of complex mixed syndromes — for
example, the classical aphasias (Badecker & Caramazza
1985; Caramazza & McCloskey 1988). To my knowledge
there has been no specific criticism of group studies that
compare control subjects with amnesics (e.g., Graf et al.
1984; Warrington & Weiskrantz 1970; see Neuropsychol-
ogy Chapter 15), patients with perceptual disorders (see
Warrington 1982a; Neuropsychology Chapter 8) or pa-
tients with supervisory or executive disorders (see Mliner
1982; Neuropsychology Chapter 14). In all three of these
areas group selection procedures are more straightfor-
ward than in aphasia research. The amnesia studies alone
have been very influential in recent memory research on
normal subjects (see Roediger 1990); hence the critics of
group studies would need very strong and concrete argu-
ments to show that these three lines of research have no
relevance for understanding normal function. In my view
such arguments have not been produced.
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3O ifore specific problems for the approach
A methodology based on a set of assumptions requires us
to consider whether the assumptions are valid in particu-
lar cases. Four seem particularly problematic - those
concerning the patient's strategy (Assumption 8b of sec-
tion 2), task difficulty (Assumption 6), individual dif-
ferences (Assumption 9), and reorganisation of function
(Assumption 8a). A selective impairment found in a par-
ticular task in some patient could just reflect: the patient's
Idiosyncratic strategy, the greater difficulty of that task
compared with the others, a premorbid lacuna In that
patient, or the way a reorganised system but not the
original normal system operates. How can one guard
against these possibilities?
A first complication is that patients can adapt to their
impairments by using strategies that are hardly ever
found In normal subjects. Many pure alexlcs read "letter-
by-letter." A less obvious possibility is that the neo-
logisms found in some jargon aphasics are a strategy,
filling the pauses that their naming difficulty causes
(Butterworth 1979). Kolk and van Grunsven (1984) have
argued that the metalinguistic judgements of aphasics can
only be understood If one considers the strategy the
aphasic might adopt to carry out an unnatural task.
A number of methodological heuristics can make the
procedure used by the patient more transparent to the
investigator - testing patients with adequate perfor-
mance on baseline tests, using ecologically valid pro-
cedures, using converging operations, using strategy-
control tests for the critical comparisons (see Bub et al.
1985), and training the patient in the appropriate pro-
cedure (e.g., Beauvois & Derouesne 1982). The more of
these safeguards one uses the more likely that Assump-
tion 8b will be satisfied.
A second problem Is that tasks are often of different
levels of difficulty. For example, well-learned informa-
tion Is easier to retrieve, so a difference between the
ability to retrieve long-term knowledge and recently
learned information as In amnesia might merely reflect a
difference In difficulty. The classical neuropsychological
solution was to seek a complementary dissociation and
thereby demonstrate a double dissociation (e.g., Teuber
1955). For instance, the Idea that the good performance of
amnesic patients on short-term memory or semantic
memory tasks merely arises because these tasks are easier
or better learned is countered by the existence of patients
with selective deficits on these tasks who have preserved
episodic long-term memory (see Neuropsychology Chap-
ters 3 and 15). The application of the resource Assump-
tion (6) shows that with some minor modifications this
remains a valid method. Indeed, it works in this particu-
lar case. A patient has been described who has grossly
impaired knowledge but in appropriate circumstance Is
normal at retrieving recently learned information (see
Coughlan & Warrington 1981).
The third complication is that a dissociation could arise
from a selection artifact because the patient was weak at
certain tasks before illness. If the dissociation Is a classical
one in which all tasks are performed at normal levels and
none are resource-limited (except for one or more that are
significantly worse and below the normal range) then
such an individual-differences account is implausible. In
many theoretically relevant cases, however, the perfor-
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mance of the patients on the tasks they carry out better is
still below the normal range even though the contrast
between the better and worse performed tasks is striking
- a strong dissociation. It is hence difficult to estimate the
statistical significance of a difference in scores. In specific
situations a counterargument can be made against this
type of artifactual explanation but this is one type of
problem for which group data provide a more solid
response.
Perhaps the most difficult of these four inference prob-
lems is the last one: Could the dissociation merely reflect
the operation of a reorganised system that is qualitatively
different from the normal one? For example, according to
the right hemisphere theory of deep dyslexia (e.g., Colt-
heart 1980b; Saffran et al. 1980), any observations of deep
dyslexic reading might have no bearing on our under-
standing of the normal reading system. The nature of the
dissociations is again relevant here. Classical dissocia-
tions are less prone to this problem as there is no reason a
reorganised system should produce the same quantitative
level of performance as the original one. This is also true if
a strong complementary or classical dissociation exists; it
is implausible that two reorganised systems with oppos-
ing characteristics should substitute for the original one in
different patients.
Considering the four potential artifacts besetting in-
ferences from neuropsychological evidence, the overall
danger of misleading conclusions is not that severe if
selective impairments are studied and if patients with the
complementary dissociation exist. It is necessary, how-
ever, to assess the approach in practice. Neuropsychology
Chapters 3 to 8 are concerned with this.
48 Conwerging
ewidence
To assess how well inferences from neuropsychological
findings converge with those from normal experimenta-
tion, it is most appropriate to consider areas where both
approaches are well developed. Neuropsychology consid-
ers auditory-verbal short-term memory, reading, writ-
ing, and the relation between input and output speech
processes in most detail, but it also touches on visual
object perception, visual attention, and long-term
memory.
Consider first, selective disorders of auditory-verbal
short-term memory in the presence of relatively intact
language, intelligence, and auditory word perception
(Neuropsychology Chapter 3). Eight patients (see, e.g.,
Warrington & Shallice 1969) with these characteristics
are discussed in Neuropsychology (and six more patients
have since been described; see Shallice & Vallar 1990).
That these dissociations can be plausibly attributed to a
specific impairment in short-term retention can be seen
in the nine patients in whom it has been investigated by
so-called Brown-Peterson recall (decline is exceptionally
rapid) or the "recency" effects in recall, which is very
restricted in the number of serial positions affected.
What short-term retention system might be implicated
and what would its function be? The patients show a set of
dissociations between impaired auditory-verbal span and
(relatively) intact visual-verbal short-term retention, in-
tact auditory nonverbal short-term retention, intact ver-
bal long-term memory, and intact speech production.
This suggests that a store exists that is specific to the
retention of speech input at the phonological level. This is
supported by complementary findings in the normal
literature (e.g., separate visual short-term store (STS) -
Broadbent et al. 1978; Margrain 1967; separate auditory
nonverbal STS - Rowe 1974; separate verbal-LTS - Craik
& Watkins 1973; Geiselman et al. 1982; separate output-
speech STS - Salame & Baddeley 1982). In addition, for
certain of the inferences, complementary support also
comes from other neuropsychological syndromes (e.g.,
separate visual STS - Caramazza et al. 1983; separate
verbal LTS - Baddeley & Warrington 1970; Drachman &
Arbit 1966; separate output-speech STS - Damasio &
Damasio 1980). Thus the idea that the retention of speech
input - presumably phonological representations - is
separable from a number of other related cognitive opera-
tions is strongly supported. What specific functions with-
in the speech comprehension process the traces facilitate
remains the subject of much debate (see Vallar & Shallice
1990, Chapters 7, 8, 14-18).
Reading disorders present a more complex picture
(Neuropsychology Chapters 4 and 5). First, there are a
considerable number of qualitatively distinct disorders to
consider, not just one. Second, certain observed impair-
ments cannot be understood merely by subtracting one or
more components from the normal system. Thus, letter-
by-letter reading, the way pure alexic patients frequently
read, is clearly a compensatory procedure; one school
holds that deep dyslexic reading is likewise realised by a
system distinct from the normal one. In this domain the
possible artifacts to which neuropsychological inference
is subject are more than merely theoretical.
Despite these difficulties, if one makes appropriate
allowance for the possibility of nontransparent syn-
dromes, complementary inferences both across syn-
dromes and with normal experimental findings again
occur. Principal amongst these is the separation of pho-
nological and semantic reading processes that first came
to attention on the basis of neuropsychological research
(contrast Marshall & Newcombe, 1973, with Rubinstein
et al. 1971). Thus four phonological readers have been
described (e.g., Schwartz et al. 1980) who read aloud
fluently but have little or no ability to comprehend the
words they read. In a complementary way, not only deep
dyslexics, of whom many have been described (e.g.,
Marshall & Newcombe 1966), but also three patients with
little preserved phonology (e.g., Levine et al. 1982) can
read to meaning although they have no useful access to
phonological information. In normal subjects dual task
experiments also support the possibility of accessing
semantic representations independently of phonological
ones (e.g., Kleiman 1975). More subtle inferences are
that spelling-to-sound units exist that are intermediate in
size between grapheme-to-phoneme and lexical (from
phonological readers, Shallice et al. 1983; from pho-
nological alexia, Derouesne & Beauvois 1985), that mor-
phemic spelling-to-sound correspondences exist inde-
pendent of the semantic system (from certain pho-
nological readers, e.g., Schwartz et al. 1980), and that
reading-to-meaning is not idiographic (Saffran 1980). The
first and third of the inferences also received support from
studies of normal subjects (e.g., McClelland 1977; Patter-
son & Morton, 1985). Overall, the inferences from differ-
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ent acquired dyslexic syndromes and from findings on
normal subjects support each other.
The situation with respect to writing is similar (Neuro-
psychology Chapter 6). We know much less about the
writing system in normal subjects than about the reading
system and indeed models of the normal writing process
are largely based on a priori analysis of the sort of system
that would be required to produce correct written forms
in, say, a language as irregular in its sound-to-spelling
correspondences as English (e.g., Morton 1980) or on an
analysis of spontaneously occurring errors (e.g., Ellis
1979). At least for the central parts of the writing process,
however, the neuropsychological evidence is more clear-
cut than for reading, as three pure syndromes exist.
These are lexical agraphia, preserved nonword writing
with Impairment of word writing (e.g., Beauvois & De-
rouesne 1981) (7 cases), the complementary syndrome,
phonological agraphia (e.g., Shallice, 1981, 2 cases) and
graphemic buffer disorder, in which writing of both
words and nonwords is similarly affected, yet motor
execution Is rapid and fluent (Caramazza et al. 1987). All
three syndromes fit well with impairments to compo-
nents on Morton's model, which was derived from a
theoretical analysis of the normal writing process.
It might be argued that reading and writing represent
especially productive areas for dissociation analysis be-
cause they are skills that cross between evolutionarily
more basic domains, although their learned nature would
conflict with Fodor's (1983) claims that modules are
necessarily Innate. In other areas, however, comparable
mappings of dissociations between normal and neuropsy-
chological findings also exist. Thus the separability of
speech input and output processes at the level of pho-
nology (Neuropsychology Chapter 7) is supported both by
the syndrome of the auditory parallel to deep dyslexia
(e.g., Michel & Andreewsky, 1983, 2 cases) and by dual-
task experiments on normal subjects (e.g., Shallice et al.
1985).
Better known are the dissociations in the domain of
memory (Neuropsychology Chapter 15) between re-
call/recognition and completion/cueing in amnesic pa-
tients (e.g., Warrington & Weiskrantz 1970) and normal
subjects (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas 1981) and between epi-
sodic and semantic processes in amnesics (Kinsbourne &
Wood 1975) and semantic-memory patients (Coughlan &
Warrington 1981) and complementarity in normal sub-
jects (Herrmann & Harwood 1980; Tulving 1972; but see
also McKoon et al. 1986; Tulving 1986). In this domain,
though, it remains an open issue whether the dissocia-
tions are appropriately explained in terms of separable
systems (see Roediger 1990; Schacter & Tulving 1990).
The amnesia literature is particularly interesting meth-
odologically. The dissociations that the amnesics show in
both short and long-term memory (e.g., Baddeley &
Warrington 1970) and completion/cueing (Warrington &
Weiskrantz 1970) were both established in about JL970
(and incidentally, on the basis of group studies). The
effects were rejected as artifactual later in the 1970s,
however, for two of the reasons discussed earlier in
section 3, problems 1 and2 (e.g., Butters &Cermak 1974;
Woods & Piercy 1974). Later again, they were accepted
as valid (e.g., Cermak 1976; Graf et al. 1984). The
potential artifacts proved less serious than originally
feared. Indeed, I know of no area in which inferences
from neuropsychological dissociations were at one time in
conflict with those from the normal literature and were
later shown to be artifactual. The types of artifact consid-
ered earlier have not proved too dangerous in practice.
5» Alternatiwe interpretations of dissociations
What gives neuropsychological findings their force Is the
specific impairments observed. Dissociations have often
been treated as evidence of isolable subsystems (e.g.,
Fodor 1983; Shallice 1979), a simple explanation of the
findings. The presence of dissociations in no way entails
the existence of isolable subsystems, however, even if the
artifacts, discussed In section 2, which complicate the
subtraction approach are not relevant. Dissociations can
arise from damage to other types of architecture. For
example, Neuropsychology Chapter 11 considers as alter-
natives continuous processing spaces, overlapping pro-
cessing regions and coupled systems. Dissociations can
also occur from impairments to different levels or modes
of operation of the same subsystem. Is it possible to
distinguish between these alternatives? At least three
lines of inquiry seem possible in principle: How do
different neuropsychological syndromes relate? How
"strong" are individual dissociations? How do the neuro-
psychological observations map onto results from experi-
mental paradigms using normal subjects? To my knowl-
edge no attempt has been made to distinguish between
rival architectures along these lines. The first and third,
have been attempted on rare occasions to seek evidence
of isolable subsystems. The first was used to predict the
existence of further central dyslexic syndromes before
they were discovered (e.g., Shallice & Warrington 1980).
One type of architecture deserves special attention
because of widespread current interest in it - connec-
tionist (or PDF) architectures (e.g., McClelland &
Rumelhart 1986). Wood (1978) suggested that lesions in
the input or output layers of a simple two-layer dis-
tributed-memory system could produce double disso-
ciations. This critical example Is not Interestingly gener-
alisable, however, as it depends on the precise input
and output vectors used. Some multilayered connec-
tionist models can be viewed as detailed realisations of
isolable subsystem. The degree of Interaction between
the different layers, however, means that the relation
between the nature of observed Impairments and the
global operation of a damaged subsystem is much more
opaque than for simple models, say, where individual
subsystems compute unambiguous representations. The
theory-stimulation function of neuropsychological evi-
dence would be weaker. A model of this sort, which is to
my knowledge the first to provide a mechanistic account
of detailed characteristics of a syndrome, is that of Mozer
and Behrmann (1990), who apply the visual attention
model MORSEL to the properties of neglect dyslexia and
attentional dyslexia (syndromes discussed in Neuropsy-
chology Chapter 13).
Connectionist models may have a more complex meth-
odological effect in cognitive neuropsychology. Hinton
and Sejnowski (1986) lesioned single units in the middle
layer of a simple three-layer connectionist network that
mapped graphemic strings to semantic features. When It
was wrong, the system tended to produce explicit errors,
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not merely arbitrary collections of semantic features.
These errors were, on average, more similar both seman-
tically and visually to the target word than to an average
member of the word set. More recently, Hinton and
Shallice (1991) lesioned a related but more complex
network in a systematic fashion. Wherever the lesion was
made, the same qualitative error pattern occurred, a
mixture of semantic errors, visual errors, and mixed
visual and/or semantic errors, an error pattern charac-
teristic of deep dyslexia (ignoring derivational errors that
were outside the domain of the model). Meth-
odologically, the rejection by recent cognitive neuropsy-
chologists (e.g., Caramazza 1984; Ellis 1987) of symptom
complexes based primarily on error types may need
revision, at least when the theories being considered are
connectionist ones with a strong "attractor" structure. If
so, this would reinforce the assumption made earlier that
the appropriate methodology for cognitive neuropsychol-
ogy research will depend on the general type of model of
the cognitive system being considered.
modules for nets)
Whether the systems that carry out the processing re-
quired in complex but routine cognitive operations like
face recognition or phonological analysis of an utterance
are best characterised as modules or networks, one may
pose the question whether the higher level processes that
must also exist - particularly those concerned with the
allocation of mental resources - operate according to
similar principles or different ones. The last section of
Neuropsychology (Chapters 12-16) is concerned with the
neuropsychological evidence on such complex processes
- knowledge, visual attention, supervisory operations,
memory, and consciousness. On the whole, the meth-
odological scruples of the earlier sections are abandoned,
and a dissociation is assumed to represent the operation of
a damaged subsystem.
The best known answer in cognitive science to the
general question posed In the preceding paragraph is
Fodor's (1983). He argues that, in addition to modular
Input systems, there exist equipotential central systems.
About these he says we can learn very little, claiming that
nothing is known about the neuropsychology of thought,
and that "there is good reason why nothing Is known
about it - namely that there Is nothing to know about
it . . . in the case of central processes you get an approx-
imation to universal connectivity, hence no stable neural
architecture" to describe (Fodor 1983, p. 119). [See also
multiple book review of Fodor's Modularity of Mind,
BBS 8(1) 1985.]
Closer examination of the neuropsychological evidence
suggests that Fodor's answer Is inadequate. Domains of
knowledge can be selectively Impaired (see Neuropsy-
chology Chapter 12) - for example, such routine thought
operations as elementary arithmetic, as in acalculia (see
Warrington 1982b). Yet the carrying out of elementary
arithmetic operations must depend on systems that
would not be modular according to a number of Fodor's
(1983) criteria for modules. Yet, if one provisionally
adopts his assumption about input systems that an ob-
served selective impairment Is evidence for a module —
and for Warrington's acalculia (1982b) patient the dis-
sociation was both classical and deep - then elementary
arithmetic operations are not the product of a global
central equipotential system.
At the very least it would seem that Fodor's thesis
requires some revision. One possibility might be to move
the upper boundary of what counts as the input system
and to separate such routine thought operations from the
central system. The processes involved in the so-called
frontal syndrome must be ineluctably central, however.
These have been characterised by Lurla (1966) as being
concerned with the programming, regulation, and ver-
ification of activity. Can disorders of these processes be
related to more standard cognitive scientific Ideas, and
could they be characterised as impairments of Fodor's
central system?
A model developed by Norman and Shallice (1986) can
be viewed as an attempt to anchor the overall theory
Luria applied to "frontal functions" within a cognitive
scientific framework. Our model was based on two main
premises. The first, introduced at the beginning of Chap-
ter 13, is that the routine selection of routine operations is
decentralised. It was suggested that the basic units un-
derlying action or thought are a very large but finite set of
discrete programs - thought or action schemas - that
either place a particular pattern, of demands on the mosaic
of functionally specific subsystems directly or when cer-
tain specific circumstances arise. A schema is selected if
its level of activation exceeds a given threshold; once
selected it remains active even if Its level of activation
falls, unless it attains its goal or is actively inhibited by a
competitor or by any higher level controlling schema.
Schemas are independently activated by triggers and are
in mutually inhibitory competition.
This process of selection between routine action or
thought operations is termed "contention scheduling." In
certain artificial intelligence work on problem solving,
however, it has been found necessary to add to a system
that routinely executes whatever solution procedure Is In
operation a planning component that operates differently
and learns from Its mistakes (see Boden 1977; Charniak &
MeOermott 1985, for review). We therefore argued that
there is an additional system - the Supervisory System -
which has access to representations of the environment
and of the organism's intentions and cognitive capacities.
This system operates not by directly controlling be-
haviour, but by modulating the lower level contention-
scheduling system by activating or inhibiting particular
schemas. It would be Involved in the genesis of willed
actions and required in situations where the routine
selection of actions is unsatisfactory - for example, in
coping with novelty, in decision making, in overcoming
temptation, or In dealing with danger.
Characteristics of frontal patients such as their "stuck-
in-set perseverations" (Sandson & Albert 1984) as exhib-
ited in the Wisconsin card-sorting task (Milner 1963) and
their apparently opposite tendency to respond to objects
in their environment by using them even when they have
no reason to do so - "utilisation behaviour" (Lhermitte
1983; Shallice et al. 1989) - can be explained as follows:
Damage to the supervisory system releases the unmodu-
lated operation of contention scheduling. In the case of
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"stuck-In-set perseverations," It is assumed that a partic-
ular thought schema, which would control a set that is no
longer appropriate, remains strongly activated by the
stimulus situation through prior overlearning and cannot
be effectively overridden without the supervisory sys-
tem. In the latter case, the lack of any other strongly
activated schema allows a schema activated only by a
stimulus trigger to become selected. These behaviors are
related to normal subjects' "action lapses" (see Reason
1984) when the supervisory system is occupied by some
unrelated thought process; similar Inappropriate data-
driven activation by overlearned triggering stimuli would
be Involved In both cases.
The errors of frontal patients on more complex tasks are
also well described as a loss of a planning or programming
component, as Milner et al. (1985) point out. Yet does one
need to postulate a presumably complex supervisory
system to carry out this function and not just an ability,
say, to Inhibit inappropriate "central sets," as suggested
by Rosvold and Mishkin (1961)? In fact, certain apparent
difficulties of frontal patients seem difficult to explain by
this simpler account. Knight (1984), for example, showed
that frontal patients lack the special P300 response to
novel stimuli exhibited by normal subjects - an absence
of a positive response, not the lack of an inhibitory one.
[See Donchin & Coles: "Is the P300 Component a Man-
ifestation of Context Updating?" BBS 11(3) 1988.]
In addition, it would seem that a supervisory system
modulating the operation of action and thought schemas
would be far from internally equipotential as claimed by
Fodor (1983) for his "central systems." Animal experi-
ments show a considerable degree of specialisation in
prefrontal cortex (see, e.g., Fuster 1980; Petrides 1987).
In humans, fractionations of the frontal syndrome are
beginning to be reported. Shallice and Burgess (1991)
have described two patients who perform well on frontal
lobe tasks except those that require the laying-down and
realising of intentions.
A clearer example of a specific function with which the
supervisory system should be concerned is dealing with
what should happen if no existing routine thought or
action schema were adequate to achieve a particular goal
or, indeed, if none were strongly triggered by the present
combination of goal and events. A person may be able to
draw on a memory of what happened in an analogous
situation, as Schank (1982) has pointed out. The whole
process of remembering has been viewed by Norman and
Bobrow (1979) as a series of cycles of specifying descrip-
tions, matching with records, and verifying candidate
memories retrieved. This approach fits well with the view
that the primary function of episodic memory is to pro-
vide the supervisory system with an additional means of
tackling nonroutine problems. According to the model,
the articulation of descriptions and the process of verifica-
tion would be controlled by the frontally located super-
visory system.
Is there any evidence that supports this speculation?
Aspects of the memory disorders of some frontal patients
are hard to explain in terms of a general organisational
problem in encoding material. Smith and Milner (see
Milner et al. 1985) found that patients with frontal lobec-
tomy had more difficulty on a frequency discrimination
task than other subjects. The authors argued that the task
calls for an orderly search through memory and that this
may be the source of the difficulty In patients with frontal
lesions. Damage to the description and verification stage
of Norman & Bobrow's (1979) theory would produce just
these types of difficulty.
More direct evidence can be obtained from the con-
fabulations that occur in so called "frontal amnesia." An
Impairment at the verification stage In Norman &
Bobrow's model seems to account well for the difficulty of
one such patient (RW) studied by Delbecq-Derouesne et
al. (1990). In a task like retention of a paired associate,
where little strain is placed on the verification process, he
performed well; In this respect, his disorder differed
markedly from that of classical amnesics. By contrast, if
stimuli were present that elicited an Irrelevant associa-
tion, RW was Incapable of selecting which of the re-
sponses retrieved was the valid one: In a recall task
confabulations were produced and in recognition tasks
distracters tended to be confidently selected.
Frontal amnesia, then, appears to be an Impairment of
that part of the supervisory system concerned with for-
mulating the description of any memories that might be
required and of verifying that any candidate memories
that have been retrieved are relevant. Classical amnesia,
by contrast, would arise from an interruption of the flow
of memory information from the processing systems to
the supervisory system. On this theory, the contrast
between semantic and episodic memory is replaced by a
related one. The new contrast is between information
accessible through the operation of some routine schema
operating directly on the processing system (the semantic
memory system) and Information that requires the super-
visory system to formulate a description and to verify any
record retrieved. The damage, moreover, seems to be
primarily to only part of the supervisory system because
on most "frontal lobe" tasks RW was at most only mildly
impaired.
Using the observation of a selective Impairment as
evidence for the existence of a specific processing system,
as Fodor (1983) did for input systems, also supports
modularity in Marr's sense for the so-called "central"
systems. The systems that modulate the on-line process-
ing systems may be almost as complex and variegated as
the systems under their control.
Finally, in Neuropsychology Chapter 16 It is argued
that the supervisory processes, together with those In-
volved in contention scheduling, episodic memory, and
the linking of language with other cognitive processes,
are responsible for the existence of conscious experience.
A functionalist account along these lines can at least
provide an explanation for the counterintuitive neuropsy-
chological findings related to consciousness that have
been described such as blindsight, aspects of prosopag-
nosia, and the split-brain syndrome. [See also: Puccetti &
Dykes: "Sensory Cortex and The Mind-Brain Problem"
BBS 1(3) 1978; and Campion: "Is Blindsight an Effect of
Scattered Light, Spared Cortex, and Near-Threshold
Vision?" BBS 6(3) 1983.]
NOTE
1. For reprints, please contact Tim Shallice, Department of
Psychology, University College London, Gower Street, Lon-
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